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Tying Fiduciary Duties to Student Loans:  One Small 
Step Out of the Massive Debt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Student loans have become such an overpowering form of debt 
for Americans that some have referred to the current generation of 
students as the “Indentured Generation.”1  In fact, it may be difficult to 
walk down a city street without passing someone who has not had to deal 
with such trials and tribulations, as over 44 million Americans 
collectively owe upwards of $1.3 trillion in student loan debt.2  This 
makes for an average of nearly $30,000 per individual borrower.3  This 
staggering number accounts for the second highest consumer debt 
category in the country, second only to mortgages.4  Moreover, it is 
estimated that about one in four of the 44 million borrowers are either in 
default or struggling to stay current on their loans.5  Student loan debt can 
be especially shackling, as it may prevent borrowers from buying homes 
or even starting families.6  Indeed, many Americans will be indebted for 
 
 1. Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation:  Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 
53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 330–31 (2013). 
 2. 2017 Student Loan Debt Statistics, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Aug. 7, 2017), https://
studentloanhero.com/student-loan-debt-statistics/. 
 3. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING:  ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC 
INPUT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 8 (Sept. 2015), http://files.consumerfinanc 
e.gov/f/201509_cfpb_student-loan-servicing-report.pdf [hereinafter STUDENT LOAN 
SERVICING]. 
 4. Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt in 2017:  A $1.3 Trillion Crisis, FORBES (Feb. 21, 
2017, 7:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/02/21/student-loan-debt-
statistics-2017/#5802b3075dab. 
 5. Shahien Nasiripour, Student Debt Giant Navient to Borrowers:  You’re on Your Own, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-
03/student-debt-giant-navient-to-borrowers-you-re-on-your-own. 
 6. See Chris Ciciora, Student Loan Debt for the Millennial Generation and 
Ineffectiveness of the Federal Student Loan Program, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 139–40 
(2016) (“Student loans cause borrowers to put off financial or personal milestones. Some of 
these milestones include marriage and having kids.”); see also Eric Pianin, 5 Alarming Facts 
About America’s $1.3 Trillion in Student Debt, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 4, 2017, 8:41 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/americas-student-loan-debt-facts-2017-4 (“Those with 
significant student debt are much less likely to own a home at any given age than those who 
completed their education with little or no student debt.”). 
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life due to the near inability to discharge student loans through 
bankruptcy.7 
Of course, dealing with student loan debt can be taxing, but it has 
become apparent that borrowers may be battling more than just their 
debt.8  A recent lawsuit filed January 18, 2017 by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “the Bureau”) alleged that Navient 
Corporation (“Navient”), the nation’s largest servicer of student loans, 
engaged in “unlawful acts and practices in connection with [its] servicing 
and collection of student loans.”9  This lawsuit raises the question of 
whether, and to what extent, student loan borrowers are entitled to 
protection from servicers.10  Currently, the CFPB “enforce[s] Federal 
consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all 
consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and 
services and that [those markets] are fair, transparent, and competitive.”11  
However, with 44 million Americans dealing with student loan debt,12 
there is only so much the CFPB can do.13  Instead, consistent standards 
and regulations should be imposed on student loan servicers to protect 
borrowers from being exploited and forced to make excessive payments 
on their loans.14 
This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II provides background 
information on the CFPB and its current lawsuit against Navient.15  Part 
III presents legal arguments for and against servicers owing a fiduciary 
obligation to student loan borrowers.16  Part IV discusses the need for 
consistent standards in the student loan market, as well as potential 
 
 7. Austin, supra note 1, at 331. 
 8. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (accusing a major 
student loan servicer of deceptive and unfair practices in their servicing of student loans). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id.; see also Motion to Dismiss, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., 
No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2017) (comparing the opposing arguments as to what 
duties and how much protection servicers owe to borrowers). 
 11. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2016). 
 12. 2017 Student Loan Debt Statistics, supra note 2. 
 13. See infra Part IV.A.  
 14. See STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 5 (“Industry commenters, including 
the two largest participants in the student loan servicing market, identify certain student loan 
servicing practices where there is significant diversity in the marketplace and suggest that 
policymakers require consistent approaches to common servicing functions . . . .”). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
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alternative standards and regulations to a fiduciary obligation.17  Part V 
concludes by advocating for a fiduciary duty, or some alternative 
regulation, to be consistently implemented across all types of student 
loans for the benefit of both borrowers and servicers.18 
II. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND NAVIENT 
The CFPB was created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), and is granted 
supervisory authority over non-depository institutions, including 
mortgage and private education lenders, as well as other institutions 
offering consumer financial products or services.19  The Bureau also has 
supervisory authority over any covered person20 who, based on 
complaints or other information from sources, it has reason to believe is 
“engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with 
respect to the offering or provision of consumer financial products or 
services.”21  Finally, the Bureau may take action “to prevent a covered 
person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive act or practice,” as it relates to consumer financial 
products or services.22 
In January 2017, the CFPB exercised its enforcement authority 
by bringing suit against Navient Corporation, formerly part of Sallie 
Mae—currently the largest student loan servicer23 in the United 
States24—and its subsidiaries, Navient Solutions, Inc. and Pioneer Credit 
 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §6, 
12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5514(a)(1) (2016). 
 20. A covered person is defined as “any person that engages in offering or providing a 
consumer financial product or service; and any affiliate of a person described in subparagraph 
(A) if such affiliate acts as a service provider to such person.” 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2016). 
 21. 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(c) (2016). 
 22. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2016). 
 23. A “loan lender” is the institution that originates the loan, or the one that allows one 
to borrow money, while a “loan servicer” is a third-party company the lender contracts with 
to oversee the repayment plan of the loan. Kali Hawlk, Student Loan Servicing Explained:  
The Difference Between Your Servicer and Lender, STUDENT LOAN HERO (June 21, 2016), 
https://studentloanhero.com/featured/student-loan-servicing-explained-difference/.  
 24. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUES NATION’S LARGEST STUDENT LOAN 
COMPANY NAVIENT FOR FAILING BORROWERS AT EVERY STAGE OF REPAYMENT (Jan. 18, 
2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largest-
student-loan-company-navient-failing-borrowers-every-stage-repayment/ [hereinafter 
FAILING BORROWERS]. 
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Recovery, Inc., for what the Bureau claims are “unlawful acts and 
practices in connection with [Navient’s] servicing and collection of 
student loans.”25  The lawsuit claims that Navient failed to correctly apply 
or allocate borrower payments to borrowers’ accounts, steered struggling 
borrowers into paying more than required on loans, obscured information 
necessary for borrowers to maintain lower payments, deceived private 
student loan borrowers about requirements to release any co-signer from 
the loan, and severely harmed the credit of disabled borrowers, including 
severely injured veterans, by misreporting that borrowers were in default 
when they were not.26  If true, these allegations should, at the very least, 
raise some questions and concerns about loan servicing behavior.  
More specifically, Navient is being accused of practices such as 
repeatedly misapplying or misallocating payments when borrowers 
began paying back their loans, often making the same error multiple 
times.27  When struggling borrowers sought to gain access to income-
driven payment plans that would allow for extended payment relief and 
other significant benefits,28 Navient allegedly steered many borrowers 
into forbearance instead,29 which can dramatically increase the total 
amount due per period of the loan.30  Borrowers in an income-driven 
repayment plan need to recertify annually, but Navient allegedly failed to 
adequately inform those borrowers of deadlines or obscured necessary 
 
 25. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 2, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017). 
 26. FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24. 
 27. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 39–43, Navient, No. 3:17-
cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24. 
 28. Under income-driven repayment plans, a borrower’s monthly payments are capped 
at a certain percentage of the borrower’s discretionary income. This allows for smaller 
monthly payments over longer periods of time than a borrower would pay under a standard 
plan. Kat Tretina, Is an Income-Driven Repayment Plan the Best Choice for You?, STUDENT 
LOAN HERO (Sept. 13, 2016), https://studentloanhero.com/featured/income-driven-
repayment-plan-think-twice/.  
 29. Forbearance may allow a borrower to reduce or postpone monthly payments for up 
to twelve months. This system is designed to benefit borrowers dealing with short-term 
emergency situations by allowing the borrower relief while they work on getting back on 
track. The issue with forbearance, however, is that interest continues to accrue on the loan 
while the borrower is in forbearance, which can add to the cost of the loan. Since the system 
is designed for short-term relief, it can be problematic for a borrower who has more long-term 
problems. Id. 
 30. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 12–23, Navient, No. 3:17-
cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24. 
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information.31  Borrowers were told they could apply for co-signer 
release if they made a certain number of consecutive payments, however, 
Navient allegedly reset the counter on the number of consecutive 
payments made so borrowers applying for co-signer release were denied 
and had to start over.32  Finally, permanently disabled borrowers with 
federal student loans, including veterans, have the right to seek 
forgiveness, but Navient allegedly misreported that borrowers who had 
their loans discharged under this program had defaulted, potentially 
damaging their credit.33 
This was not simply an isolated incident, as the CFPB reported 
that between March 1, 2016 and February 28, 2017, consumer complaints 
were submitted against more than 320 companies, including “student loan 
servicers, debt collectors, private student lenders, and companies 
marketing student loan ‘debt relief.’”34  In fact, the CFPB saw a 325%  
increase in complaints against servicers during the same twelve-month 
period.35  In addition to Navient, servicing companies such as 
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, Nelnet, Great Lakes 
Higher Education Corporation, and others also received a significant 
number of complaints.36  The five issues about which there were the most 
complaints during this period were:  (1) borrower communication, (2) 
income-driven repayment plan enrollment, (3) payment allocation, (4) 
public service loan forgiveness, and (5) payment processing.37   
Following the complaint filed by the CFPB, Navient 
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss38 which was denied by the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.39 The 
motion to dismiss did, however, raise a significant question:  should a 
fiduciary duty exist on behalf of servicers upon which borrowers can 
 
 31. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 23–31, Navient, No. 3:17-
cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24. 
 32. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 34–39, Navient, No. 3:17-
cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24. 
 33. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 31–34, Navient, No. 3:17-
cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24. 
 34. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MID-YEAR REPORT 6 (June 2017), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_PSLF-midyear-report.pdf. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 13. 
 37. Id. at 12.  
 38. Motion to Dismiss, Navient, No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2017). 
 39. Memorandum Opinion at 60, Navient, No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) 
(denying Navient’s motion to dismiss). 
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“reasonably rely on [a student loan servicer] to counsel them about their 
many options?”40 
III. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 
 A fiduciary is “someone who is required to act for the benefit of 
another person on all matters within the scope of their relationship.”41  In 
common law, the term has generally come to be defined as “an agent who 
is required to treat his principal with utmost loyalty and care—treat him, 
indeed, as if the principal were himself.”42  It follows, then, that student 
loan borrowers would want servicers to owe a fiduciary obligation 
because this would relieve some of the work and pressure of keeping up 
with the loans.  Servicers, however, would want student loans to work 
like any other loan, where both sides are assumed competent and work at 
arms-length.43 
A. Arguments for Servicers Owing a Fiduciary Obligation to 
Student Loan Borrowers 
The first argument for servicers owing a fiduciary duty to student 
loan borrowers is a combination of statutory interpretation and 
contractual estoppel.44  The Consumer Financial Protection Act makes it 
“unlawful for . . . any covered person or service provider . . . to engage in 
any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice.”45  The terms “unfair” 
and “deceptive” have been interpreted either in this statute,46 or in other 
similar statutes where courts have adopted and applied the interpretation 
 
 40. Nasiripour, supra note 5 (quoting Navient CEO Jack Remondi’s response to the 
CFPB’s lawsuit). 
 41. Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 42. Pohl v. Nat’l Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128–29 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing 
Mkt. St. Associates Ltd P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 43. See, e.g., Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., 642 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1160–61 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 
(“DHI Mortgage correctly notes the absence of an actionable duty between a lender and 
borrower in that loan transactions are arms-length and do not invoke fiduciary duties.”). 
 44. The notion of this combination was first put forth in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania’s Memorandum Opinion denying Navient’s Motion to Dismiss. Memorandum 
Opinion at 44–47, Navient, No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017). 
 45. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B) (2016). 
 46. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (2016) (defining “unfairness” as “[an] act or practice [that] 
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonable avoidable 
by consumers; and such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition”). 
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to the language in this statute.47  The term “abusive,” however, is arguably 
the most important in this situation, and is defined under the statute as 
any act or practice that, inter alia, “takes unreasonable advantage of . . . 
the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the 
interests of the consumer.”48  This is in essence the contractual concept 
of promissory estoppel.49  It is important to note that the requisite 
“promise” here does not need to be explicit, but rather can be implied by 
language or other conduct.50  Thus, if a servicer, either through statements 
or conduct, creates a “reasonable reliance by the consumer” that it will 
act “in the interest of the consumer,” it cannot then take unreasonable 
advantage of that reliance.51 
Since Navient is the nation’s largest servicer of student loans,52 
and currently involved in litigation concerning this particular practice,53 
it is the ideal candidate to use as illustrative evidence here.  Navient’s 
website is littered with statements urging borrowers to reach out if they 
are experiencing problems, asserting that the corporation has the 
resources and expertise to help borrowers “achieve financial success” and 
 
 47. See id. (discussing the meaning of deceptive and unfair practices); Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1193 n.7 (adopting the definition given to “deceptive 
act or practice” under the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)) as applicable to 
the language in 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2016) (defining 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices” as acts or practices involving foreign commerce that 
“cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the United States; or involve 
material conduct occurring within the United States”). 
 48. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(2)(C). 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (“A promise which the promisor 
should reasonable expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promise or a third 
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise.”). 
 50. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 534 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a) (“[J]ust as assent may be manifested by 
words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to make a promise may be 
manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances . . . .”). 
 51. See Memorandum Opinion at 19, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 
3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (“Navient’s alleged practice is abusive under the CFP 
Act if Navient took unreasonable advantage of a borrower’s reasonable reliance that Navient 
would act in the borrower’s interest.”). 
 52. See David Scheer, JPMorgan to Sell $6.9 Billion of Student Loans to Navient, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 18, 2017, 4:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-
18/navient-agrees-to-buy-6-9-billion-of-student-debt-from-jpmorgan (discussing how the 
Navient, “the largest servicer of student loans in the U.S.,” has just agreed to buy a $6.9 billion 
portfolio of student loans from JPMorgan Chase & Co.). 
 53. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Navient, No. 3:17-cv-
00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (alleging Navient has been or continues to be involved in 
practices in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)).  
  
216 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 22 
“make the right decision for [their] situation.”54  Furthermore, Navient’s 
Chief Executive Officer Jack Remondi has repeatedly made statements 
urging borrowers to reach out for assistance, quite possibly implying a 
level of fiduciary care that Navient would assume with borrowers.55  
Since Navient is not the only servicer to make these types of statements,56 
it is conceivable that a court may find these servicers to be holding 
themselves out as fiduciaries to borrowers.57  
Even if a servicer has not made such statements, it could still be 
subject to a fiduciary obligation due to statements made by the 
 
 54. See Who We Are, NAVIENT, https://www.navient.com/about/who-we-are/ (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2017) (“We help our clients and millions of Americans achieve financial success 
through our services and support.”); Avoiding Delinquency and Default, NAVIENT, https://
www.navient.com/loan-customers/postponing-payments/avoiding-default/ (last visited Sept. 
9, 2017) (“Our representatives can help you by identifying options and solutions, so you can 
make the right decision for your situation.”); 5 Habits of Successful Borrowers, NAVIENT, 
https://www.navient.com/loan-customers/getting-started/successful-student-loan-borrowers/ 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2017) (“Navient is here to help. We’ve found that, 9 times out of 10, 
when we can talk to a struggling federal loan customer we can help him or her get on an 
affordable payment plan and avoid default.”). 
 55. See Jack Remondi, Four Recommendations to Improve Student Loan Success, 
MEDIUM (Apr. 12, 2016), https://medium.com/@JackRemondi/four-recommendations-to-
improve-student-loan-success-94488bf0bb7f (“If borrowers are led to believe that calling 
their servicer is useless, who benefits? There needs to be a concerted effort to encourage 
borrowers to contact their loan servicer as a resource.”); Jack Remondi, It’s Time to Put 
Students First, MEDIUM (May 23, 2016), https://medium.com/@JackRemondi/its-time-to-
put-students-first-7cd578ca266e (“At Navient, we make it a priority to educate our federal 
borrowers about income-driven options” . . . “Help is a phone call away.”); Jack Remondi, 4 
Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program:  A Common Sense Recipe for Reform, MEDIUM 
(Feb. 12, 2017), https://medium.com/@JackRemondi/4-ideas-for-a-better-student-loan-
program-a-common-sense-recipe-for-reform-521e651d612 (“For some borrowers, student 
loan debt can be especially daunting. The good news is that borrowers can turn to their student 
loan servicers for help to navigate the complex repayment options.”); Nasiripour, supra note 
5 (noting that in September 2014, Remondi told investors at a Wall Street conference, “[o]ur 
job as a servicer is to really work with those customers and make sure that they understand 
the differences and which program best fits their needs”). 
 56. See Welcome to FedLoan Servicing!, FEDLOAN SERVICING, https://myfedloan.org/ 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2017) (“We are your student loan servicer and we have one goal:  to help 
you successfully repay your loans.”); Get to Know Mohela, MOHELA, https://
www.mohela.com/DL/common/about.aspx (last visited Sept. 9 2017) (“As your 
knowledgeable and approachable go-to resource for account information and repayment 
options, we provide the tools to help you successfully repay your student loan.”). 
 57. There has already been some inclination that this is a possibility, or at least not an 
unreasonable argument.  In response to Navient’s Motion to Dismiss, Judge Robert D. 
Mariani declined to dismiss the argument that Navient created a reasonable expectation to act 
in the interest of its customers. See Memorandum Opinion at 46, Navient, No. 3:17-cv-00101 
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (“It is therefore enough that a borrower’s reliance that a loan servicer 
will act in their interest is reasonable, irrespective of whether a legal duty actually exists on 
the part of the loan servicer to act in the borrower’s interest.”). 
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Department of Education (“Department”).58  Not only does the 
Department’s website make claims and urge borrowers to reach out to 
servicers similar to the claims and statements on other servicers’ 
websites,59 but current and former agents of the Department have also 
made statements that would imply a fiduciary duty.60  This includes 
former Director of the Office of Postsecondary Education David 
Bergeron who said, “[t]he Education Department ultimately is asking 
loan servicers to act on its behalf to fulfill its fiduciary responsibility to 
borrowers.”61  The Department contracts out the servicing of these federal 
loans to servicers and, as such, the servicer is beholden to the lender in 
certain aspects of the loan terms.62  Professor William J. Cox has argued 
that only lenders can hold servicers accountable, though they “lack the 
necessary incentives to pursue an action because any action taken would 
likely adversely affect their bottom line.”63  However, a lender’s 
reasoning and refusal to pursue action is irrelevant in this case; all that 
matters is that lenders have the ability to hold servicers accountable.64  
The fact that a lender controls some terms of a loan, and a servicer is 
accountable to the lender, means that a borrower can reasonably rely on 
statements and promises a lender makes about how a servicer will handle 
the loan.65  As such, if a lender makes statements or promises that imply 
or expressly state that a servicer will act in the borrower’s interest, a 
fiduciary obligation could be found.66  
 
 58. The U.S. Department of Education is a lender for Federal student loans. See FED. 
STUDENT AID, LOANS, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans (last visited Sept. 9, 2017) 
(“The William D. Ford Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program is the largest federal student loan 
program. Under this program, the U.S. Department of Education is your lender.”). 
 59. See FED. STUDENT AID, LOAN SERVICERS, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/
understand/servicers (last visited Sept. 9, 2017) (“The loan servicer will work with you on 
repayment plans and loan consolidation and will assist you with other tasks related to your 
federal student loan.”). 
 60. Nasiripour, supra note 5. 
 61. Nasiripour, supra note 5. 
 62. William J. Cox, The Student Borrower:  Slave to the Servicer, 27 LOY. CONSUMER L. 
REV. 189, 192 (2015). 
 63. Id. at 203. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Memorandum Opinion at 46, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 
3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (“It is therefore enough that a borrower’s reliance 
that a loan servicer will act in their interest is reasonable, irrespective of whether a legal duty 
actually exists on the part of the loan servicer to act in the borrower’s interest.”). 
 66. Id. 
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The second argument in favor of servicers owing a fiduciary duty 
to student loan borrowers is that current case law illustrates certain factors 
that may create a fiduciary or confidential relationship, and those factors 
are often present in the student loan context.67  To determine whether a 
fiduciary relationship exists, one must analyze the relationship in its 
entirety, taking into account the particular circumstances or facts 
surrounding it.68  Courts have relied on certain factors for assistance, 
including (1) a solicitation or an imposition of trust and confidence for a 
period of time,69 and (2) situations where there is a great disparity of 
position70 and the disparity is considered “very important or absolutely 
essential.”71   
 
 67. It must be noted that the information being cited here comes from G.G. BOGERT ET 
AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482 (Rev. 2d ed. 1978), which is titled “Abuse of 
confidential relationship.” This is significant as § 481 is titled “Breach of fiduciary 
obligation.” While this may seem misleading, Bogert begins § 482 with the sentences, “[t]here 
is no uniform practice among courts in their use of the phrases ‘fiduciary relation’ and 
‘confidential relation,’ and often the terms are used as synonyms. The term confidential 
relation, however, often is used when the relationship is similar to those noted in a fiduciary 
relation but does not fit into one of the well-defined categories of fiduciary law.” The 
categories mentioned in § 481 include, inter alia, “[a] trustee of an express trust,” “personal 
representatives of estates,” and “[a] guardian or conservator.” The section goes on to list some 
categories where a fiduciary relationship has or has not been found. Under that category, 
“mortgagor or mortgagee” is mentioned as one where a fiduciary agreement has been found 
not to exist. As will be discussed later, this note looks to distinguish between mortgage lending 
and student loan lending. As such, student loan lending does not fall into one of the mentioned 
categories of fiduciary relationships under § 481, and so it will be examined under § 482. It 
is also worth noting that some of the cases cited under § 482 do, in fact, refer to the relationship 
as “fiduciary” rather than “confidential,” further illustrating the synonymous relationship.  
 68. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, §§ 481, 482. 
 69. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482; see also Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 
(7th Cir. 1992) (“If a person solicits another to trust him in matters in which he represents 
himself to be expert as well as trustworthy and the other is not expert and accepts the offer 
and reposes complete trust in him, a fiduciary relation is established.”); Grenier v. Harley, 
250 F.2d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1957) (finding a confidential relationship existed where the 
defendant, prior to the death of the decedent, acted as his business agent and attorney, and 
decedent reposed trust and confidence in defendent); Lee v. Choi, 754 S.E.2d 371, 375–76 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that a fiduciary duty existed because defendant had a relationship 
with plaintiffs in which he “was in a position of trust and confidence, was entrusted with 
financial responsibility and authority, and was privy to personal information”). 
 70. The “disparity of position” here is a general term to be determined on a case by case 
basis. The disparity can be in regards to bargaining power, management power, level of 
sophistication, dependence, influence, etc. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482 n.7. 
 71. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482; see also Miller, 957 F.2d 1375; Francois v. 
Francois, 599 F.2d 1286, 1292 (3rd Cir. 1979) (noting that a confidential relationship arises 
when one party places confidence in another, which results in superiority and influence on 
one side); Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 352, 240 N.W.2d 507, 512 (1976) 
(“Disparity of business experience and invited confidence could be a legally sufficient basis 
for finding a fiduciary relationship”).  
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As mentioned previously, student loan servicers and the 
Department of Education do their part in soliciting borrowers to place 
their trust and confidence in servicers.72  More important, however, is the 
disparity of position between servicers and student loan borrowers.  
Student borrowers are in an especially weak position because of their 
youth or inherent lack of education at the outset of the loan.73  Loan 
servicers are undoubtedly experts in the field, as a significant portion of 
their services involve managing borrowers’ accounts, processing 
payments, and assisting borrowers as they navigate through the various 
and “overly complex array” of repayment options.74  The repayment 
options can be so complex that “[e]ven student loan experts are baffled 
by the unnecessary hurdles and steps created by the federal repayment 
system.”75  This complex system is inherently designed to have young 
borrowers.76  Indeed, close to 60% of the total U.S. student loan debt was 
used to finance undergraduate degrees,77 which are almost exclusively 
sought by students who were high school graduates the prior year.78  It is 
also axiomatic that a discrepancy in knowledge or education would exist 
here, as students who obtain student loans are generally not experts in 
finance, but rather seeking to learn and educate themselves further.79  This 
disparity in the relationship between a servicer and student loan borrower 
could lead to the creation of a fiduciary duty.80 
 
 72. See Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (“For some 
borrowers, student loan debt can be especially daunting. The good news is that borrowers can 
turn to their student loan servicers for help to navigate the complex repayment options.”); 
LOAN SERVICERS, supra note 59 (“The loan servicer will work with you on repayment plans 
and loan consolidation and will assist you with other tasks related to your federal student 
loan.”); Remondi, It’s Time to Put Students First, supra note 55 (“Our data show that more 
than 9 times out of 10, when we reach a struggling federal borrower, we successfully help 
him or her avoid default.”). 
 73. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482. 
 74. Remondi, It’s Time to Put Students First, supra note 55; FAILING BORROWERS, supra 
note 24. 
 75. Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55. 
 76. See Mala Gusman Bridwell, Student Loan Bankruptcies, 1978 WASH. U. L. Q. 593, 
595–96 (1978) (“The purpose of the student loan programs are . . . to allow every person the 
fullest possible educational opportunity by making loans available to those who could not 
otherwise obtain a loan because of their age and lack of collateral borrowing history.”). 
 77. 2017 Student Loan Debt Statistics, supra note 2 (“About 40 percent of the $1 trillion 
student loan debt was used to finance graduate and professional degrees.”). 
 78. KEVIN EAGAN ET AL., THE AMERICAN FRESHMAN:  NATIONAL NORMS FALL 2016 27 
(2017) (illustrating statistics of college freshman, one of which being 97.9% of first-time, full-
time freshmen graduated high school in 2016). 
 79. See Cox, supra note 62, at 191 (“First, students are generally not economists.”). 
 80. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482. 
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The final argument to be made for servicers owing a fiduciary 
duty to student loan borrowers is that the servicers are simply an 
extension of the federal student loan lender,81 the federal government,82 
which should be considered in a fiduciary relationship with the people it 
serves.83  Since the federal government is the lender of federal student 
loans,84 while servicers merely oversee the repayment of the loans,85 the 
duties and obligations should be viewed through the relationship between 
the government and the student, or the lender and the borrower. 
The question now becomes whether the federal government owes 
a fiduciary duty to the borrowers and, if so, whether that fiduciary duty 
should transfer to the servicer as a part of the loan.86  There are numerous 
historical and theoretical reasons, both in general and specifically 
pertaining to the United States, to believe a government is in a fiduciary 
relationship with its people.87  In his Second Treatise of Civil 
Government, John Locke argued that the government has a fiduciary 
obligation to the people.88  Locke’s idea was that in the original social 
contract the citizens conveyed power to the government on the condition 
that the power would be used for the public good and, as such, the 
government was obliged to act on behalf of the people rather than in its 
 
 81. See Hawlk, supra note 23 (“In other words, student loan servicing companies act as 
middlemen between you and the original lender.”). 
 82. It should be noted that this argument pertains solely to federal student loans, not 
private student loans. 
 83. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 706–13 
(2013) (discussing the “Constitutional History and Political Theory” for considering 
politicians and the government as being in a fiduciary relationship with the people). 
 84. The U.S. Department of Education is a lender for Federal student loans. See LOANS, 
supra note 58 (“The William D. Ford Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program is the largest federal 
student loan program. Under this program, the U.S. Department of Education is your 
lender.”). 
 85. Hawlk, supra note 23. 
 86. See Ryan Lane, A Guide to Understanding Student Loan Servicer Changes, U.S. 
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-
ranger/2015/11/18/a-guide-to-understanding-student-loan-servicer-changes (stating that 
when a lender contracts a loan out to a servicer, the general terms of the loan will stay the 
same, and the borrowers must be notified of any changes).  
 87. See Rave, supra note 83, at 706–13 (discussing both the views of John Locke, as well 
as those of the Founding Fathers, on government’s owing a fiduciary duty to their people). 
 88. Rave, supra note 83, at 708; Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest 
Spending:  The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL. 239, 245 (2007). 
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own interests.89  Locke was not alone, as this became a widely accepted 
view in England by the eighteenth century.90 
This popular theory was not contained to England, as it had a 
heavy influence on the Founding Fathers as well.91  After the revolution, 
newly independent Americans frequently referred to legislative 
representatives and political officials as being in an agency or trusteeship 
capacity.92  The vast majority of delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention were experienced lawyers or businessmen and were well 
aware of what these concepts meant.93  The Framers were not referring to 
these concepts through mere hollow rhetoric, but rather implanted them 
in the Constitution to “impose on public officials fiduciary obligations 
comparable to those duties borne by private law fiduciaries.”94  Indeed, 
these concepts were central to the Framers in the drafting, debating, and 
ratifying the Constitution, and helped shape their understanding of 
political representation.95  
The theory is not simply based on the views of historical figures 
such as Locke, but is also supported by private law justifications for 
fiduciary duties.96  The political theories of contract and delegation of 
power reinforce the ideals the Framers leaned upon.97  It may help to view 
the American constitutional democracy as a contract, the terms of which 
delegate power from the people to the government.98  The U.S. 
Constitution is the contract, defining the relationship between the 
 
 89. Rave, supra note 83, at 708–09; Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 245. 
 90. Rave, supra note 83, at 709. 
 91. Rave, supra note 83, at 710; Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 245–46. 
 92. Rave, supra note 83, at 710; Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 246; U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; U.S CONST. art. I § 3, cl. 7; US CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 2 (“Office of 
Trust”). 
 93. Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 247–48. 
 94. Rave, supra note 83, at 711; Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 245–47; 
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1087, 
1178 (2004). 
 95. Robert G. Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 94, at 1083–86; see also U.S. CONST. 
art. I § 10 cl. 1 (prohibiting the states from passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (forbidding states from depriving any person of equal protection of 
the law). 
 96. Rave, supra note 83, at 711. 
 97. Rave, supra note 83, at 711. 
 98. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WAS. L. REV. 1119, 
1121–22 (1998); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (analogizing the 
Constitution to a corporate charter, claiming that it establishes a “body politic and corporate”). 
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representatives and the people.99  In this contract, the people agreed to be 
bound by the rules and policies of a government, only if it in turn agreed 
to act in the sole interests of the people.100  This is the basis for the 
fiduciary obligation imposed on government officials, and it should 
translate into the relationship the federal government has with its people, 
such as through student loan lending.101  If a fiduciary duty was extended 
to the people—the borrowers—the federal government and servicers 
could not contractually waive the duty without the mutual assent of the 
borrower.102  
B. Arguments Against Servicers Owing a Fiduciary Obligation to 
Student Loan Borrowers 
The first argument against servicers owing a fiduciary duty is 
simply that the Consumer Financial Protection Act does not place any 
affirmative duty on the part of the servicer to act in the interest of the 
consumer; rather it simply prohibits certain acts or practices.103  As 
previously mentioned, the Act makes it “unlawful for . . . any covered 
person or service provider . . . to engage in any unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive act or practice.”104  Again, one definition for the term “abusive” 
is when a servicer “takes unreasonable advantage of . . . the reasonable 
reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the 
consumer.”105  This does not mean a servicer has an affirmative duty to 
counsel borrowers and act in their best interests;106 instead the servicer’s 
 
 99. Rave, supra note 83, at 712. 
 100. See Rave, supra note 83, at 712 (“We can discern those duties by asking what the 
parties would have agreed to if bargaining were costless, and the natural answer is that the 
people would have agreed to be bound by the rules of the legislature only if the legislature 
had agreed to act solely in the interests of the people.”). 
 101. Rave, supra note 83, at 711–13. 
 102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either make a 
promise or begin or render a performance.”). 
 103. The title given to 12 U.S.C. § 5536 (2016) is “Prohibited acts.” As a general matter, 
this inherently means there would be no affirmative duties under this section, only a duty to 
abstain from certain practices. What’s more, there is nothing in this section of the act stating 
that a covered person or service provider must do something, or that it must act in the interest 
of the borrower. The section simply outlines types of practices that are prohibited.  
 104. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B). 
 105. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(2)(C) (2016). 
 106. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 611 (3rd Cir. 
1995) (“[T]o be liable for material nondisclosures, a party must have a duty to speak”).  
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only duty is to refrain from taking “unreasonable advantage” of a 
consumer’s “reasonable reliance;” as well as to refrain from any 
prohibited acts listed or any other illegal acts such as fraud.107  Indeed, 
these sections do not even assert that a consumer’s reasonable reliance 
will create a duty to act in the consumer’s interests; they only state that if 
a consumer does in fact reasonably rely on the servicer to act in his or her 
interest, the servicer cannot take “unreasonable advantage” of that 
reliance.108  This, again, is not a duty to act in a certain way, but rather a 
duty to refrain from acting in a certain way.109  
The next argument against fiduciary duties comes from current 
case law, where courts have consistently held that in mortgage lending 
practices a loan servicer generally does not owe a fiduciary duty to a 
borrower.110  While there may be some differences in the terms, 
mortgages and student loans are both loans nonetheless.111  Like student 
loans, mortgages have servicers who handle the loans.112  So why should 
servicers of student loans be assigned a higher duty of care than mortgage 
loan servicers if there is no material difference between the two?  The 
 
 107. 12 U.S.C. § 5536.  
 108. 12 U.S.C. § 5536; 12 U.S.C. § 5531. 
 109. Judge Mariani seemingly rejected this argument as it pertained to Navient’s Motion 
to Dismiss in Memorandum Opinion at 46–47, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., 
No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017). However, the decision was not entirely based on 
the merits of the argument, but rather Judge Mariani found that Navient “placed reliance 
inducing statements on their webpage,” and there was sufficient evidence to the claim that 
Navient had taken unreasonable advantage of that reliance. It is also worth noting that this 
was an opinion rejecting a motion to dismiss, not deciding the case on its merits. The argument 
being made here is not based specifically on Navient, but rather on a hypothetical servicer 
who has not made reliance inducing statements and has not taken unreasonable advantage of 
its consumers.  
 110. See, e.g., Bret Binder v. Weststar Mortg., Inc., No. CV 14-7073, 2016 WL 3762710, 
at *20 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2016) (“Much like mortgage lenders, loan servicers do not owe 
borrowers any specific fiduciary duties based upon their servicer/borrower relationship.”); 
Edwards v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLP, 24 F.Supp. 3d 21, 30 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[D]efendants 
are correct that loan servicers . . . owe no fiduciary duties to borrowers . . . .”); Monreal v. 
GMAC Mortg., LLC, 948 F.Supp. 2d 1069, 1078 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“Similarly, loan servicers, 
like lenders do not owe borrowers any fiduciary obligations . . . .”). 
 111. See Tobie Stranger, Student Debt vs. Mortgage Debt:  What Makes Them So 
Different?, CONSUMER REPORTS (June 27, 2016),  https://www.consumerreports.org/student-
loan-debt-crisis/student-loans-vs-mortgages-what-makes-student-debt-different/ (describing 
some differences between mortgage debt and student debt, including the differences in 
interest, repayment and refinancing differences, and the ability (or lack thereof) to discharge 
debt in bankruptcy). 
 112. See What’s the Difference Between a Mortgage Lender and a Servicer?, CFPB (Sept. 
13, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/whats-the-difference-between-a-mor 
tgage-lender-and-a-servicer-en-198/ (explaining the servicer’s role in collecting mortgage 
payments). 
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language courts have used is unambiguous, recognizing that “[a] debt is 
not a trust and there is not a fiduciary relation between [a] debtor and 
creditor as such;”113 and further holding that “loan servicers do not owe 
a fiduciary duty to borrowers.”114  It makes little sense to hold a student 
loan servicer to a higher standard simply because of the youth or 
ignorance of its borrowers.115  
A third argument to be made against a servicer owing a fiduciary 
duty to a student loan borrower comes from a doctrine known as the 
“business judgment rule.”116  This is “a presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors or officers of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith, and in an honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interest of the company.”117  At first glance, it would 
appear that this rule should not fit in the student loan market since federal 
student loans are issued by the government, not a corporation.118  
However, student loan servicers are indeed corporations, and as such 
should be afforded the same benefits and protections as any other 
corporation.119  If the business judgment rule is applied to student loan 
servicers, as it has previously been applied to loan servicers, then no 
fiduciary duty would exist.120   
 
 113. Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal. App. 2d 323, 332, 227 P.2d 484, 490 (1951). 
 114. Moreno v. Citibank, N.A., No. C 09-5339 CW, 2010 WL 1038222, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 19, 2010); see also Conquest v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. CV 16-03604, 2017 WL 
1177106, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017) (“Under Pennsylvania law, it is well established that 
a lender does not owe a fiduciary duty to a borrower.”); Henok v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 
915 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Nor is a debtor-creditor relationship ordinarily a 
fiduciary relationship.”); Iannuzzi v. Am. Mortg. Network, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 125, 138 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“New York courts have held that a fiduciary duty generally does not exist 
between mortgage brokers and borrowers.”). 
 115. See supra Part III.A. 
 116. See generally, Stephen M. Bainbrdige, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 81 83, (2004) (“The business judgment rule is corporate law’s 
central doctrine, pervasively affecting the roles of directors, officers, and controlling 
shareholders.”). 
 117. Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Eason, 17 F.3d 1126, 1133 n.5 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 118. The U.S. Department of Education is a lender for Federal student loans. See LOANS, 
supra note 58 (“The William D. Ford Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program is the largest federal 
student loan program.  Under this program, the U.S. Department of Education is your 
lender.”). 
 119. See LOAN SERVICERS, supra note 59 (“A loan servicer is a company . . . .”). It is also 
worth noting that some student loan servicers are publicly traded companies, including 
Navient Corporation (NASDAQ:  NAVI), and Nelnet (NYSE:  NNI). 
 120. See First Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d 
510, 514 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that no fiduciary relationship should be inferred in the 
context of loan participation agreements absent “unequivocal contractual language” since the 
parties are obligated to make decisions regarding the loan “in good faith and in a reasonable 
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C. Compliance Issues  
A fiduciary duty seems regal in theory, but implementation of 
such a duty may prove difficult.  The Department of Labor recently issued 
a new fiduciary regulation that will require financial advisors to act in 
their clients’ best interest when giving retirement investment advice.121  
This regulation was met with much resistance, prompting President 
Trump to delay implementation of some portions of the rule in order to 
further study the consequences.122  Critics worry about the complexity of 
implementing such a regulation, as well as the increased compliance costs 
that could lead to brokers abandoning clients with small account 
balances.123  In addition, this rule could increase liability costs and subject 
advisors to a higher risk of litigation.124 
While these are significant issues to consider, they may not 
translate entirely to student loans if a fiduciary duty was imposed on 
servicers.  First, a loan account is fundamentally different than an 
investment account in that the “consumer” in an investment gives money 
to the financial advisor in hopes that it will generate future income, while 
the “consumer” of a loan is given money now that she must repay later.125  
This difference, in essence, removes the possibility of a servicer 
abandoning a borrower’s account because it would eliminate the 
possibility of receiving the rest of the money owed on that loan.126  
 
manner,” which is “more indicative of a typical business relationship among equally 
sophisticated entities dealing at arm’s length than of a fiduciary relationship”). 
 121. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20945 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). 
 122. Kristen Ricaurte Knebel, DOL to Propose Pushing Back Fiduciary Rule another 18 
Months, 44 Pension & Benefits Rep. (BNA) No. 32 (Aug. 15, 2017). 
 123. See Bruce Kelly, Financial Trade Groups to DOL:  Advisers Dumping Small 
Accounts, INVESTMENTNEWS (Aug. 8, 2017, 1:34 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20170808/FREE/170809936/financial-trade-groups-to-dol-advisers-dumping-small-
accounts (“Critics say the DOL measure is too complex and costly and would force brokers 
to abandon clients with small account balances.”).  
 124. Id.; Jamie Hopkins, New Fiduciary Rule For Financial Advisors Moves The Needle, 
But In Which Direction?, FORBES (June 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jamiehopkins/2017/06/14/new-fiduciary-rule-for-financial-advisors-moves-the-needle-but-
in-which-direction/#36e9a2774caa.  
 125. Aditya Shankar, What is the Difference Between a Loan and an Investment?, QUORA 
(Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-a-loan-and-an-
investment.  
 126. See Investopedia Staff, Loan Servicing, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/l/loan_servicing.asp (“Loan servicing is the administration 
aspect of a loan from the time the proceeds are dispersed until the loan is paid off.”) (emphasis 
added) (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). 
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Similar to financial advising, however, it is likely that a fiduciary 
obligation would increase compliance and liability costs, which in turn 
would likely be passed on to borrowers.127  Although this would indeed 
increase the costs associated with a borrower’s student loan, it could be 
seen by borrowers as an equitable trade off in comparison to the potential 
costs associated with predatory lending practices that could raise the costs 
and interest associated with a loan, as well as significantly damaging a 
borrower’s credit.128 
D. Should Servicers Owe a Fiduciary Obligation to Student Loan 
Borrowers? 
Persuasive arguments exist on both sides of this debate, and it can 
be quite easy for one to simply side with those who are in the same or 
similar circumstances.129  Many students will want to enforce a fiduciary 
obligation on loan servicers because they are the ones dealing with the 
debt, and understandably want the process to be as painless and 
inexpensive as possible.130  On the other hand, many creditors and those 
interested in financial deregulation will want loan servicers to be free of 
any fiduciary obligations because after all, these are businesses, not 
charitable organizations, and this could make doing business more 
difficult.131  Regardless of the side one falls on, the question of whether a 
loan servicer should owe a fiduciary obligation to student borrowers still 
remains.   
 
 127. See Hopkins, supra note 124 (discussing the increase in compliance and liability costs 
on financial advisors, and the likelihood that the increase in costs would likely be passed on 
to consumers). 
 128. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (accusing Navient, a 
student loan servicer, of illegal lending practices that resulted in borrowers having to pay more 
on their accounts and/or damaged the credit of borrowers). 
 129. See supra Part III. 
 130. See Austin, supra note 1, at 333 (“As a result of financial stress, student loan debtors 
experience high levels of personal depression, family dysfunction, adverse health effects, and 
delay major purchases.”). 
 131. See Nasiripour, supra note 5 (citing to Navient’s motion to dismiss where it claims 
borrowers cannot reasonably rely on the servicer to counsel them about their many options 
because the primary role of the servicer is to collect their payments); see also Bruce Kelly, 
DOL Fiduciary Rule to Cost The Securities Industry $11B by 2020:  Study, INVESTMENTNEWS 
(Sept. 21, 2016, 3:35 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160921/FREE/1609 
29978/dol-fiduciary-rule-to-cost-the-securities-industry-11b-by-2020-study (discussing how 
compliance costs for implementing the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule for retirement 
accounts will cost the brokerage industry $11 billion in revenue over four years).  
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The arguments that have been presented here lay the legal 
foundation for whether one could enforce such an obligation, but they do 
not answer the public policy question of whether society should hold 
student loan servicers to a higher standard, or whether it would be better 
to afford them the same protections and liberties that are awarded to loan 
servicers in other financial markets.  The answer to this question should 
be a resounding yes—student loan servicers should be held to a higher 
standard than loan servicers in other financial markets.  
First, the case law holding that a fiduciary duty does not exist for 
mortgage loan servicers should not influence the student loan market 
because student loans and mortgages are sufficiently distinguishable.132  
For example, interest rates for mortgages are constantly fluctuating based 
on secondary markets,133 while interest rates for federal student loans are 
set by Congress and are typically higher than those for mortgages.134  
Additionally, mortgage loans can be discharged in bankruptcy,135 yet 
student loans are typically not discharged unless the borrower can prove 
an “undue hardship,” which is quite difficult.136  Mortgage servicers can 
be sued for improper practices, while there is currently little recourse for 
individual student borrowers due to lack of consistent standards.137  
 
 132. See Stranger, supra note 111 (describing some of the key differences between 
mortgages and student loans). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.; see also FREDDIE MAC, 15-YEAR FIXED-RATE MORTGAGES SINCE 1991, http://
www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms15.html (lasted visited Sept. 14, 2017) (illustrating 
average interest rates for 15-year fixed-rate mortgages in 2016 to be 2.93%, and 3.29% in 
2017 through August); FREDDIE MAC, 30-YEAR FIXED-RATE MORTGAGES SINCE 1971, http://
www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (illustrating average 
interest rates for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages in 2016 to be 3.65%, and 4.04% in 2017 
through August); FED. STUDENT AID, INTEREST RATES AND FEES, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/
types/loans/interest-rates#older-rates (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (illustrating current student 
loan rates for direct subsidized loans as 4.45%, direct unsubsidized loans for undergraduates 
as 4.45%, direct unsubsidized loans for graduate and professional students as 6%, and direct 
PLUS loans as 7%). 
 135. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328 (2016). 
 136. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2016); see also Ciciora, supra note 6, at 147–48 (outlining 
the Brunner three-prong test to show that not forgiving the student loan would be an undue 
hardship, which includes (1) the debtor must not be able to pay the loan by “engaging in some 
short-term, belt tightening,” or living by the bare essentials; (2) “showing that the current 
financial situation will continue during the repayment period;” and (3) the debtor must make 
good faith efforts to obtain employment and maximize income, while minimizing expenses). 
 137. Stranger, supra note 111; see also Ted Wegner, Student Loan Servicing Standards:  
Should the Government Look to Other Markets to Better Protect Student Borrowers, 42 J. 
CORP. L. 749, 763 (2017) (examining the lack of consistent standards in the student loan 
market, and potential solutions garnered from other markets). 
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Refinancing is much simpler with mortgages, as it does not lead to the 
forfeiting of consumer protections like refinancing student loans would, 
if they can even be refinanced at all.138  Finally, mortgages generally do 
not grow over time,139 while even Navient’s CEO Jack Remondi has 
acknowledged the complexities of the different repayment plans for 
student loans,140 which can cause the principal balance to grow 
substantially over time.141  Significant differences such as these warrant 
placing student loans in a separate category from mortgages, and 
therefore considering them independently.  
Generally inherent in student loans is the lack of knowledge and 
expertise by the borrower due to the fact that he or she is acquiring the 
loan in order to obtain an education.142  In such a complex field,143 this 
leads to a “great disparity of position”144 between borrowers and servicers 
that is undoubtedly “very important or absolutely essential.”145  Such a 
disparity allows servicers to make a profit by severely taking advantage 
of borrowers,146 while the borrower becomes so increasingly hampered 
by the overwhelming debt that he or she must put off or refrain from 
important financial or personal milestones like buying a home or having 
children.147  Additionally, it is likely that many borrowers will be 
 
 138. Stranger, supra note 111; Ryan Lane, 4 Things to Think About When Refinancing 
Student Loans, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 29, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/
blogs/student-loan-ranger/2015/04/29/4-things-to-think-about-when-refinancing-student-
loans (warning that while federal student loans may be able to be refinanced into private loans, 
it may cause interest rates to increase and even remove the option of having the loan forgiven). 
 139. Stranger, supra note 111. 
 140. See Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (“Even 
student loan experts are baffled by the unnecessary hurdles and steps created by the federal 
repayment system.”). 
 141. Stranger, supra note 111; see also Ciciora, supra note 6, at 143 (explaining the 
difficulties with student loan repayment, including the concept of capitalized interest which 
result when interest is added to the principal amount of the loan, leading to the borrower 
“paying interest on interest”). 
 142. See Cox, supra note 62, at 191 (“First, students are generally not economists.”) 
(discussing the potential naivety of young students involved in the student loan process). 
 143. See Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (“Even 
student loan experts are baffled by the unnecessary hurdles and steps created by the federal 
repayment system.”). 
 144. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482. 
 145. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482. 
 146. The complaint in Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp. illustrates the types 
of practices servicers can do to take advantage of borrowers due to their lack of expertise or 
knowledge. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017). 
 147. Ciciora, supra note 6, at 139–40. 
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burdened by their student loans for much of their lifetimes since the loans 
cannot be easily discharged through bankruptcy.148   
While most student loan borrowers are not experts in the field, it 
is essential that student loan servicers are.149  Servicers solicit the trust150 
of student loan borrowers to do their job not only correctly, but also in 
good faith,151 and should not be able to take advantage of that trust simply 
because a borrower is young or ignorant at the outset of the loan.  Some 
have begun referring to this generation of Americans as the “Indentured 
Generation”152 because they are a “class of indentured servants who must 
work to free themselves of the bondage of educational debts”153 for most 
or all of their lives.  As much as one may wish student loan borrowers 
were more informed or knowledgeable, the reality of the situation is most 
are not, and so fiduciary obligations on student loan servicers should be 
in place to protect borrowers who already must deal with the crushing 
burden of student debt. 
IV. CONSISTENT STANDARDS 
Although imposing a fiduciary duty may be one possible solution 
to student loan borrower protection, consistent standards and regulations 
 
 148. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2016) (making it impossible to discharge student loan debt 
through bankruptcy unless the debtor can prove an undue hardship). 
 149. See LOAN SERVICERS, supra note 59 (“The loan servicer will work with you on 
repayment plans and loan consolidation and will assist you with other tasks related to your 
federal student loan.”). 
 150. This is a very important part of the language mentioned in Bret Binder to create a 
fiduciary duty. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“If a person solicits 
another to trust him in matters in which he represents himself to be expert as well as 
trustworthy and the other is not expert and accepts the offer and reposes complete trust in him, 
a fiduciary relation is established.”). 
 151. See Remondi, Four Recommendations to Improve Student Loan Success, supra note 
55; Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (“For some 
borrowers, student loan debt can be especially daunting.  The good news is that borrowers 
can turn to their student loan servicers for help to navigate the complex repayment options.”). 
 152. Austin, supra note 1. 
 153. Austin, supra note 1, at 330–31 n.2 (quoting Janet Lorin, Indentured Students Rise 
as Loans Corrode College Ticket, BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.blo 
omberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-09/indentured-students-rise-as-loans-corrode-college-
ticket.). 
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across all student loans154 may be similarly effective.155  Unlike the credit 
card market156 or mortgage lending,157 there is no existing federal 
statutory or regulatory framework providing consistent standards for the 
servicing of student loans.158  While student loans differ significantly 
from mortgages,159 the standards and regulations that govern mortgage 
lending and servicing, as well as credit card servicing, could shed light 
on possible solutions to student loan borrower protection issues.160  The 
key is to make sure any standards or regulations implemented are 
consistent across all types of student loans, even if that regulation is 
imposing a fiduciary duty.161 
A. Continuous, Clear Contact and Early Intervention 
While there are various reasons why a student loan borrower may 
struggle with payments, one issue that seems easily preventable is the 
lack of information.162  Since the student loan system can be quite 
complex,163 borrowers frequently have issues with basic information, 
 
 154. There are four main types of postsecondary education loans:  (1) Direct Loans 
(federal loans made directly to borrowers by the Department of Education through the 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program), (2) Federal Family Education Loan Program 
loans (originated by private lenders and guaranteed by the federal government, (3) Federal 
Perkins Loans (administered by participating institutions and co-funded by the federal 
government and institutions of higher education), and (4) Private student loans (made by 
depository and non-depository financial institutions, states, institutions of higher education, 
and other entities). The first three types are made pursuant to the Higher Education Act of 
1965, while private loans are governed by federal and state laws rather than the HEA. Joint 
Statement of Principles on Student Loan Servicing, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,389, 67,390 (Nov. 2, 
2015). 
 155. This is only a cursory analysis in order to illustrate possibilities other than a fiduciary 
duty, as well as the central need for consistency in any standards or regulations imposed on 
the student loan market. For a more in-depth examination of potentially beneficial standards 
and regulations, see Wegner, supra note 137, at 766. 
 156. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 157. Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.30–41 (2017). 
 158. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 11. 
 159. See supra Part III.C. 
 160. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 12. 
 161. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 5. 
 162. See Cox, supra note 62, at 198 (discussing the frequent inability of student loan 
borrowers to obtain all accurate information on payment application and other important 
aspects of their loans). 
 163. See Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (describing 
selecting a student loan as a labyrinth); STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 4 (“Loan 
servicers also comment that the complexity of the student loan programs may contribute to 
these problems.”). 
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such as how their payments are being applied164 or whether they are 
eligible to enroll in alternative repayments plans.165  As the Navient case 
illustrates, even when servicers communicate with borrowers there is no 
guarantee that the information will be clear or helpful.166  Further, there 
is little incentive for servicers to work with delinquent borrowers in an 
attempt to mitigate damages and get borrowers back on track.167 
Like with mortgage lending, student loan servicers could be 
forced to make contact with delinquent borrowers early in the process168 
and stay in contact169 to attempt to discover what issues the borrower may 
be having and what loss mitigation solutions may be available.170  
Further, servicers could assign personnel, much like a case worker, to 
delinquent borrower accounts to provide more personalized attention.171  
In addition, servicers could be required to publish eligibility criteria on 
their websites for the various alternative repayment options.172  Servicers 
could also be required to apply payments to accounts on the same or next 
day as they are received, and provide monthly billing statements to 
borrowers similar to that required of credit card servicers.173  
Implementation of standards and regulations such as these would lead to 
increased transparency and communication between borrowers and 
servicers,174 which would be a significant step in the right direction. 
 
 164. See Cox, supra note 62, at 198 (“Students are frequently unable to find out from their 
servicers how payments are applied when paying more than the minimum amount due.”). 
 165. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 108. 
 166. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 4, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (alleging Navient failed 
to disclose deadlines and obscured key information). 
 167. Wegner, supra note 137, at 763. 
 168. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39 (2017) (“[A] servicer shall establish or make good faith efforts 
to establish live contact with a delinquent borrower no later than the 36th day of the borrower’s 
delinquency.”). 
 169. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40 (2017) (requiring a mortgage servicer to maintain policies that 
help the borrower stay in contact during delinquencies). 
 170. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 109. 
 171. See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40 (requiring a mortgage servicer to assign personnel to 
delinquent borrowers). 
 172. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 112. 
 173. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666b-1666c (2016). 
 174. Wegner, supra note 137, at 763. 
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B. Notice and Appeal Process 
Similar to the administrative law process, student loan servicers 
could be subject to a notice and appeal system.175  After a servicer 
conducts a review to determine whether a borrower is eligible for any 
loan modification or alternative repayment plan, that decision could be 
subject to an appeal and subsequent hearing.176  Similarly, if a borrower 
feels there has been an error on her account or relating to payment 
allocation, she could request an investigation to respond to and correct 
the issue.177  The borrower would then have the right to appeal any 
adverse decisions or findings, and be allowed some sort of informal 
review, mediation, or formal administrative hearing before a neutral third 
party.178  
V. CONCLUSION 
A fiduciary obligation would undoubtedly add to the workload 
and compliance costs of a student loan servicer,179 but the benefits 
outweigh the costs.  The disparity in position between servicers and 
student loan borrowers180 leaves the borrowers far too exposed at the 
mercy of the servicer, as has become apparent with the allegations against 
Navient.181  As much as one might wish that student loan borrowers were 
fully informed and knowledgeable enough to protect themselves in this 
situation, the empirical evidence shows that this does not happen.182  
Although the costs of compliance would likely be passed on to the 
consumer, it is realistic to believe this cost could be spread amongst all 
borrowers at a price that would make the increased cost an equitable trade 
 
 175. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54, 556–57 (2016) (requiring notice and appeal system for 
administrative, military, and foreign affairs agencies of the U.S. government). 
 176. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note, at 113. 
 177. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 113. 
 178. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 113. 
 179. See supra Part III.C. 
 180. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482 (asserting that “a great disparity of position 
and this disparity [being] treated as very important or absolutely essential” may create a 
fiduciary duty). 
 181. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 
v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); see also FAILING BORROWERS, 
supra note 24 (discussing the allegations against Navient in their handling and servicing of 
student loans). 
 182. See supra Part III.A. 
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off to the amplified protection.183  Although a fiduciary duty could be 
beneficial for student loan borrower protection, other standards and 
regulations could be implemented as well.184  Regardless of what standard 
or regulation is implemented, it is vital that it be consistently applied 
across all types of student loans, as consistency will help both borrowers 
and servicers alike in handling the massive student loan debt in the United 
States.185  
 
SEAN R. WHELEHAN 
 
 
 183. See supra Part III.C.  
 184. See supra Part IV. 
 185. See supra Part IV; also see STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 5 (“Industry 
commenters, including the two largest participants in the student loan servicing market, 
identify certain student loan servicing practices where there is significant diversity in the 
marketplace and suggest that policymakers require consistent approaches to common 
servicing functions . . . .”). 
